Showing posts with label fiscal cliff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fiscal cliff. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Uncertainty as a Tool

At the Fed, uncertainty is frequently blamed for dragging down the economy. "There’s no question that slow growth, high unemployment, and significant uncertainty are challenges for monetary policy," John Williams of the San Francisco Fed remarked earlier this year. He added:
There’s pretty strong evidence that the rise in uncertainty is a significant factor holding back the pace of recovery now...More generally, research shows that heightened uncertainty slows economic growth, raises unemployment, and reduces inflationary pressures. This pattern has held over the past three decades, but the effects have been particularly notable in recent years. For example, capital spending has downshifted noticeably since early last year...  The job market also shows the effects of uncertainty...
Williams and other Fed officials have pointed to several sources of uncertainty. The fiscal cliff is an often-cited example, as is the European debt crisis. These sources of uncertainty are basically exogenous to monetary policy, but the Fed itself can also add or reduce uncertainty through its policies and communications. A handful of economists--George Shultz, Michael Boskin, John Cogan, Allan Meltzer, and John Taylor-- wrote in a Wall Street Journal editorial that "The Fed is adding to the uncertainty of current policy. Quantitative easing as a policy tool is very hard to manage. Traders speculate whether and when the Fed will intervene next."

If uncertainty really does have significant effects on the economy, and the Fed really can significantly influence the level of uncertainty, then a logical implication is that uncertainty management is a powerful policy tool. And yet, at least in most countries (with a notable exception that I will get to), this implication does not seem to be taken seriously. For all that policymakers bemoan the effects of uncertainty, they seem reluctant to seriously address it, which makes me wonder if it is simply a convenient scapegoat. Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, called for more accomodative monetary policy in a speech on April 2.
I think that there are several possible approaches available to the Committee. For example, the FOMC could reduce the public’s level of policy uncertainty by clarifying the nature of the economic conditions that would lead the Committee to reduce or stop its current asset purchases....However, [this] would require the FOMC to make relatively complex changes to the language of its current communications.
He ultimately rejected the notion of using uncertainty management as a policy tool, however, calling instead for a lower unemployment threshold.

The notable exception is Turkey, where the central bank deliberately increased uncertainty to address its policy goals. The iMFdirect blog describes the situation:
In mid 2010 the Turkish central bank decided to introduce a policy that increased uncertainty in interest rates hoping that would stop foreign investors who were pouring money into the country in search of a quick buck... The Turkish economy was overheating. Money poured into the country from foreign investors attracted by a strong economy and high yields. A lending boom resulted in excessive growth along with an appreciating exchange rate and widening current account deficit. While evidence of success, these kinds of capital inflows are a headache policymakers would rather avoid, as they expose a country to risks that affect the economy and financial system as a whole, while undermining the objective of controlling inflation... 
Although targeting inflation, in 2010 the Turkish central bank became increasingly vocal about dangers to financial stability. In the absence of a timely response from the banking supervisor, it started to employ less traditional tools with an explicit purpose of addressing both price and financial stability concerns. A cornerstone of the strategy was using policies that created uncertainty.
The uncertainty-generating strategy entailed widening the so-called interest rate corridor. The upper end of the corridor is the overnight lending rate, and the lower end is the overnight borrowing rate. The iMFdirect explains,
In October 2010, the central bank sharply lowered the overnight borrowing rate, at which banks deposit money at the central bank, while keeping the overnight lending rate, at which the central bank lends money to banks, unchanged. By varying the volume of liquidity provided to the markets through repo auctions, which are essentially short-term collateralized loans, it started to generate a lot of volatility in the overnight interbank rate within this widened interest rate corridor... 
Previously, the overnight interbank rates were kept close to the policy rate at which the central bank provides liquidity through quantity repo auctions, indicating the potential rate-of-return for a foreign investor. As the corridor widened, the volatility of the market rates increased. While on average the market rates continued to be close to the policy rate, now it was the “floor” of the corridor that signaled to investors a guaranteed rate-of-return. Lowering it, it was hoped, would deter speculative inflows.
The Turkish central bank also began to provide liquidity to the markets through different repo facilities. By varying the amounts of liquidity provided through these facilities, the central bank could change the cost of lending to banks on a daily basis which creates uncertainty for local banks. Turkish Central Bank Governor Erdem Basci "confounded economists" with his latest move a few days ago. Bloomberg reports that
Economists are split on whether Turkish monetary policy is looser or tighter...BNP Paribas SA, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Oyak Securities and Ata Invest interpreted the move as loosening policy to focus on boosting growth, while BGC Securities said it was contractionary. Morgan Stanley described it as “neither here nor there” and Finansbank called it “confusing.”
The iMFdirect post writes that it is too early to judge the benefits and drawbacks of Turkey's approach. They point out, and I agree, that the banking supervisor could have employed macroprudential measures sooner to address some of the concerns about excessive growth and capital inflows without the need for the central bank to use uncertainty to address these concerns. Still, it is interesting to see uncertainty added to the toolbox.

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Fiscal Cliff, Platinum Coin, and Reign of the Dollar

Almost two years ago, Barry Eichengreen published an op-ed called "Why the Dollar's Reign is Near and End." The article condenses many of the arguments of his book Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System. He writes (my emphasis added):
Finally, there is the danger that the dollar's safe-haven status will be lost. Foreign investors—private and official alike—hold dollars not simply because they are liquid but because they are secure. The U.S. government has a history of honoring its obligations, and it has always had the fiscal capacity to do so. 
But now, mainly as a result of the financial crisis, federal debt is approaching 75% of U.S. gross domestic product. Trillion-dollar deficits stretch as far as the eye can see. And as the burden of debt service grows heavier, questions will be asked about whether the U.S. intends to maintain the value of its debts or might resort to inflating them away. Foreign investors will be reluctant to put all their eggs in the dollar basket. 
The recent fiscal cliff fiasco and the current debt ceiling and platinum coin issues make me wonder if Eichengreen's prophesy is coming closer to fruition. So I started by looking at the exchange rate of the dollar against some other currencies from 2011 onwards. I chose the Canadian Dollar (blue line) and the Australian Dollar (green line), since the IMF recently declared them official reserve currencies, and since they are not as contaminated by recent events as the Euro and the yen. Look at the very far right of the graph, and you see both series drop down. That means that the dollar lost value relative to those currencies. One U.S. dollar can buy less Canadian or Australian dollars than before. In other words, the U.S. dollar got weaker.


Let's zoom in and have some fun with Google. I looked at Google trends data for the term "fiscal cliff." Google Trends gives you a measure of search volume for a particular term over time. The thick green line is the search volume for "fiscal cliff" and the dashed line marks its maximum. Notice how, when concern about the fiscal cliff got really high, the dollar got weaker. After President Obama signed the bill on January 2, the dollar continued to weaken, though not as drastically (the flatter downward slope). This is just a "playing around" finding and obviously not econometrically rigorous, but lends some anecdotal evidence to Eichengreen's predictions. Severe fiscal problems are chipping away at the dollar's "exorbitant privilege." If you want to have some fun, try out making a similar graph with the search term "platinum coin."