An Inflation Expectations Experiment

Last semester, my senior thesis advisee Alex Rodrigue conducted a survey-based information experiment via Amazon Mechanical Turk. We have coauthored a working paper detailing the experiment and results titled "Household Informedness and Long-Run Inflation Expectations: Experimental Evidence." I presented our research at my department seminar yesterday with the twin babies in tow, and my tweet about the experience is by far my most popular to date:

I gave a 90 minute econ seminar today with the twin babies, both awake. Held one and audience passed the other around. A first in economics?

— Carola Conces Binder (@cconces) September 28, 2017

Consumers' inflation expectations are very disperse; on household surveys, many people report long-run inflation expectations that are far from the Fed's 2% target. Are these people unaware of the target, or do they know it but remain unconvinced of its credibility? In another paper in the Journal of Macroeconomics, I provide some non-experimental evidence that public knowledge of the Fed and its objectives is quite limited. In this paper, we directly treat respondents with information about the target and about past inflation, in randomized order, and see how they revise their reported long-run inflation expectations. We also collect some information about their prior knowledge of the Fed and the target, their self-reported understanding of inflation, and their numeracy and demographic characteristics. About a quarter of respondents knew the Fed's target and two-thirds could identify Yellen as Fed Chair from a list of three options.

As shown in the figure above, before receiving the treatments, very few respondents forecast 2% inflation over the long-run and only about a third even forecast in the 1-3% range. Over half report a multiple-of-5% forecast, which, as I argue in a recent paper in the Journal of Monetary Economics, is a likely sign of high uncertainty. When presented with a graph of the past 15 years of inflation, or with the FOMC statement announcing the 2% target, the average respondent revises their forecast around 2 percentage points closer to the target. Uncertainty also declines.

The results are consistent with imperfect information models because the information treatments are publicly available, yet respondents still revise their expectations after the treatments. Low informedness is part of the reason why expectations are far from the target. The results are also consistent with Bayesian updating, in the sense that high prior uncertainty is associated with larger revisions. But equally noteworthy is the fact that even after receiving both treatments, expectations are still quite heterogeneous and many still substantially depart from the target. So people seem to interpret the information in different ways and view it as imperfectly credible.

We look at how treatment effects vary by respondent characteristic. One interesting result is that, after receiving both treatments, the discrepancy between mean male and female inflation expectations (which has been noted in many studies) nearly disappears (see figure below).

There is more in the paper about how treatment effects vary with other characteristics, including respondents' opinion of government policy and their prior knowledge. We also look at whether expectations can be "un-anchored from below" with the graph treatment.

The Limited Political Implications of Behavioral Economics

A recent post on Marginal Revolution contends that progressives use findings from behavioral economics to support the economic policies they favor, while ignoring the implications that support conservative policies. The short post, originally a comment by blogger and computational biologist Luis Pedro Coelho, is perhaps intentionally controversial, arguing that loss aversion is a case against redistributive policies and social mobility:

"Taking from the higher-incomes to give it to the lower incomes may be negative utility as the higher incomes are valuing their loss at an exaggerated rate (it’s a loss), while the lower income recipients under value it... 

...if your utility function is heavily rank-based (a standard left-wing view) and you accept loss-aversion from the behavioral literature, then social mobility is suspect from an utility point-of-view."

Tyler Cowen made a similar point a few years ago, arguing that "For a given level of income, if some are moving up others are moving down... More upward — and thus downward — relative mobility probably means less aggregate happiness, due to habit formation and frame of reference effects."

I don't think loss aversion, habit formation, and the like make a strong case against (or for) redistribution or social mobility, but I do think Coelho has a point that economists need to watch out for our own confirmation bias when we go pointing out other behavioral biases to support our favorite policies. Simply appealing to behavioral economics, in general, or to loss aversion or any number of documented decision-making biases, rarely makes a strong case for or against broad policy aims or strategies. The reason is best summarized by Wolfgang Pesendorfer in "Behavioral Economics Comes of Age":

Behavioral economics argues that economists ignore important variables that affect behavior. The new variables are typically shown to affect decisions in experimental settings. For economists, the difficulty is that these new variables may be unobservable or even difficult to define in economic settings with economic data. From the perspective of an economist, the unobservable variable amounts to a free parameter in the utility function. Having too many such parameters already, the economist finds it difficult to utilize the experimental finding.

All economic models require making drastic simplifications of reality. Whether they can say anything useful depends on how well they can capture those aspects of reality that are relevant to the question at hand and leave out those that aren't. Behavioral economics has done a good job of pointing out some aspects of reality that standard models leave out, but not always of telling us exactly when these are more relevant than dozens of other aspects of reality we also leave out without second thought. For example, "default bias" seems to be a hugely important factor in retirement savings, so it should definitely be a consideration in the design of very narrow policies regarding 401(K) plan participation, but that does not mean we need to also include it in every macroeconomic model.

The Great Recession and Preferences for Redistribution

Differences in attitudes towards welfare and redistribution are an important source of political tension, especially during recessions. What factors shape people's attitudes towards welfare and redistribution? There are two main strands of thought on this question in the literature. One strand emphasizes economic self-interest as a key determinant of attitudes toward welfare and distribution. According to this view, people’s position in the labor market, exposure to layoff risk, and financial status are the main factors determining their attitudes. Another strand emphasizes different ideological dispositions on issues such as fairness, equality, and the role of government.

It is empirically difficult to distinguish between the two strands, since material circumstances and ideology may influence each other. Two recent papers take advantage of the Great Recession in their empirical design to study social preference formation. First is a paper by Yotam Margalit titled "Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession":

I use an original panel study that consists of four waves of surveys in which the same national sample of respondents was contacted for repeat interviews between July 2007 and March 2011. In these repeat interviews, detailed information was collected not only on respondents’ changing labor market circumstances but also on their political attitudes. Utilizing this rich longitudinal data, covering periods both before and after the eruption of the financial crisis, I estimate how individuals’ preferences on welfare policy shift in response to the personal experience of three types of economic shocks: a substantial drop in household income, a subjective decrease in perceived employment security, and the actual loss of a job. 

The central finding of the analysis is that voters’ preferences regarding welfare policy are strongly affected by changes in their own economic circumstances. In particular, the loss of employment is found to have a major effect, increasing the average probability of support for greater welfare spending by between 22-25 percentage points.

An interesting secondary finding is the following:

The analysis also reveals that the experience of the economic shock does indeed lead to a convergence in the welfare preferences of harmed individuals who prior to the shock held distinct political views. In particular, I find that in response to a personal economic shock such as layoff, Republicans and Independents grew significantly more supportive of welfare assistance, while among Democrats the effect was much smaller.

The effect may not be permanent:

I find that with the passing of time, as job losers regain employment, their support for the expansion of welfare spending decreases significantly. This shift in attitude among the re-employed is more frequent among voters on the right. 

The other paper is a working paper by Raymond Fisman, Pamela Jakiela, and Shachar Kariv called "How did the Great Recession Impact Social Preferences?" This paper focuses on the formation of ideological dispositions toward equity and redistribution. This is an experimental paper utilizing the Xlab at UC Berkeley. Subjects were drawn from the UC Berkeley student body, the socioeconomic composition of which is held fairly constant by the admissions office. The same experiments were conducted both before and during the Great Recession. Subjects played different variations of the "dictator game," in which one player decides how much money (or tokens) to allocate to herself and to other players. The game is an experimental test of people's self-interestedness. Variations of the game, discussed in the paper, allow researchers to disentangle selfishness from the willingness to tradeoff efficiency and equity.

Our main fi nding is that the Great Recession had a dramatic eff ect on individual social preferences: subjects who participated in laboratory dictator games prior to the economic downturn are signi ficantly more altruistic than those who took part in identical experiments after the onset of the recession. Our experimental design--employing graphical representations of modified dictator games that vary the price of redistribution--enables us to distinguish indexical selfi shness from the willingness to tradeoff equality and e fficiency. Moreover, our experimental method generates many observations per subject, and we can therefore analyze both types of social preferences at the individual level. We fi nd that subjects exposed to the economic downturn place greater emphasis on effi ciency and display greater levels of indexical sel fishness.

Loving the Long Shot

The latest recipient of the 2012 Carolyn Shaw Bell Award is Professor Catherine Eckel of Texas A&M. This award is given annually by the American Economic Association Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP) to recognize an individual who has furthered the status of women in economics. Eckel is an experimental economist who has studied the role of a wide range of social and psychological factors in economic exchange-- attitudes toward risk, gender differences, beauty, trust, corruption, and charitable giving, to name a few.

One of her recent papers is particularly interesting from a macroeconomics and finance perspective: "Loving the Long Shot: Risk Taking with Skewed Lotteries" (2012, with coauthor Philip Grossman). The study addresses a widely noted conundrum, that risk-averse individuals voluntarily play the lottery. The expected payoff of a lottery ticket is less than the price of the ticket. Lotteries are positively skewed, since the vast majority of tickets have low payoff but there is a very small probability of a very large prize. Eckel and Grossman use a laboratory protocol to elicit the skewness preferences of 93 test subjects. They can isolate the effect of positive skewness on subjects' willingness to take risky gambles. If you haven't read an experimental economics paper before, I highly recommend reading Section 3 (pages 7-9) of their paper for an idea of how experimental design works in this field. From the conclusions:

We find that, controlling for risk preferences, individuals are overwhelmingly skewness-seeking in their lottery choices; lotteries with skewed payoffs are more attractive than lotteries with the same expected earnings and risk (variance) but lacking skewness.  Given equal expected earnings and risk, 84.9 percent of our subjects select a lottery with skewness = 1 over a lottery with skewness = 0 and 88.2 percent also prefer a lottery with skewness = 1 or 2 to a lottery with skewness = 0... More importantly, we find that increased skewness in the payoff structure entices a sizeable share of our sample (37.6 percent) to take on greater risk in their choice of lotteries. The change in lottery choices resulting from the skewing of payoffs increases the risk subjects face more than three times as much as it increases their expected payoffs.

The first thing that came to mind when I read this paper was the remarkable lottery loan governemnt fundraising scheme in England in the late 17th and early 18th century, shortly before the South Sea Bubble. An unprecedentedly large lottery was called the "Two Million Adventure." Tickets cost £100 and guaranteed a 6% yield annuity. In addition, tickets won prizes. The maximum prize was £20,000 and every ticket won a prize of at least £10. Prizes were paid in the form of a fixed sum annuity over a period of years, meaning the government held the prize money as a loan until it was paid out to the winners. Investors went crazy for tickets, and all tickets were sold within 9 days. Lottery payoffs were positively skewed. Including the prizes, the great mass of investors earned around a 6.5% yield, but a few lucky winners won much larger amounts, including one grand prize winner. Overall, the average yield was 8%, but the vast majority earned less and a few earned much more. Standard risk preferences suggest that investors would have preferred to buy annuities that simply guaranteed 8% yield, but Eckel's findings explain why investors so loved the lottery tickets. Richard Dale's book "The First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble" explains how the lottery loans were related to the notorious South Sea Bubble.

Lottery loans were hugely popular in other countries too. The New York Times in 1889 noted that "The new lottery loan has caused a perfect mania among the public of St. Petersburg... At least one hundred times the amount of the 172,000,000 rubles required have already been offered."

Today in the U.S., 42 states and the District of Colombia have lotteries, but positively-skewed payoffs in finance are much more pervasive than explicit lotteries. Most data on stock prices or asset returns has positive or negative skew (unlike normally-distributed data which has zero skew.) For large banks, an implicit or explicit bailout guarantee can put a lower bound on the payoff of risky investments without imposing an upper bound, a widely recognized source of moral hazard which has frequently been blamed for the financial crisis. Prevalent and strong skewness-seeking preferences could make the moral hazard problem stronger than standard models would predict. 

I am glad that CSWEP recognized Eckel's contributions to women in economics and hope the wider economic community will spend some time reviewing and discussing her very interesting research.