Estimation of Historical Inflation Expectations

The final version of my paper "Estimation of Historical Inflation Expectations" is now available online in the journal Explorations in Economic History. (Ungated version here.)

Abstract: Expected inflation is a central variable in economic theory. Economic historians have estimated historical inflation expectations for a variety of purposes, including studies of the Fisher effect, the debt deflation hypothesis, central bank credibility, and expectations formation. I survey the statistical, narrative, and market-based approaches that have been used to estimate inflation expectations in historical eras, including the classical gold standard era, the hyperinflations of the 1920s, and the Great Depression, highlighting key methodological considerations and identifying areas that warrant further research. A meta-analysis of inflation expectations at the onset of the Great Depression reveals that the deflation of the early 1930s was mostly unanticipated, supporting the debt deflation hypothesis, and shows how these results are sensitive to estimation methodology.

This paper is part of a new "Surveys and Speculations" feature in Explorations in Economic History. Recent volumes of the journal open with a Surveys and Speculations article, where "The idea is to combine the style of JEL [Journal of Economic Literature] articles with the more speculative ideas that one might put in a book – producing surveys that can help to guide future research. The emphasis can either be on the survey or the speculation part." Other examples include "What we can learn from the early history of sovereign debt" by David Stasavage, "Urbanization without growth in historical perspective" by Remi Jedwab and Dietrich Vollrath, and "Surnames: A new source for the history of social mobility" by Gregory Clark, Neil Cummins, Yu Hao, and Dan Diaz Vidal. The referee and editorial reports were extremely helpful, so I really recommend this if you're looking for an outlet for a JEL-style paper with economic history relevance.

My paper grew out of a chapter in my dissertation. I was interested in inflation expectations in the Great Depression after serving as a discussant for a paper by Andy Jalil and Gisela Rua on "Inflation Expectations and Recovery from the Depression in 1933:Evidence from the Narrative Record." I also remember being struck by  Christina Romer and David Romer's, (2013, p. 68) remark that a whole “cottage industry” of research in the 1990s was devoted to the question of whether the deflation of 1930-32 was anticipated.
I found it interesting to think about why different papers came to different estimates of inflation expectations in the Great Depression by examining the methodological issues around estimating expectations when direct survey or market measures are not available. I later broadened the paper to consider the range of estimates of inflation expectations in the classical gold standard era and the hyperinflations of the 1920s.

A lot of my research focuses on contemporary inflation expectations, mostly using survey-based measures. Some of the issues that arise in characterizing historical expectations are still relevant even when survey or market-based measures of inflation expectations are readily available--issues of noise, heterogeneity, uncertainty, time-varying risk premia, etc. I hope this piece will also be useful to people interested in current inflation expectations in parts of the world where survey data is unreliable or nonexistent, or where markets in inflation-linked assets are underdeveloped.

What I enjoyed most about writing this paper was trying to determine and formalize the assumptions that various authors used to form their estimates, even when these assumptions weren't laid out explicitly. I also enjoyed conducting my first meta-analysis (thanks to the recommendation of the referee and editor.) I found T. D. Stanley's JEL article on meta-analysis to be a useful guide.

Federal Reserve Communication with Congress

In 2003, Ben Bernanke described a central bank's communication strategy as "regular procedures for communicating with the political authorities, the financial markets, and the general public." The fact that there are three target audiences of monetary policy communication, with three distinct sets of needs and concerns, is an important point. Alan Blinder and coauthors note that most of the research on monetary policy communication has focused on communication with financial markets. In my working paper "Fed Speak on Main Street," I focus on communication with the general public. But with the recent attention on Congressional calls to audit or reform the Fed, communication with the third audience, political authorities, also merits attention.

Bernanke added that "a central bank's communications strategy, closely linked to the idea of transparency, has many aspects and many motivations." One such motivation is accountability. Federal Reserve communication with political authorities is contentious because of the tension that can arise between accountability and freedom from political pressure. As Laurence Meyer explained in 2000:

Even a limited degree of independence, taken literally, could be viewed as inconsistent with democratic ideals and, in addition, might leave the central bank without appropriate incentives to carry out its responsibilities. Therefore, independence has to be balanced with accountability--accountability of the central bank to the public and, specifically, to their elected representatives. 

It is important to appreciate, however, that steps to encourage accountability also offer opportunities for political pressure. The history of the Federal Reserve's relationship to the rest of government is one marked by efforts by the rest of government both to foster central bank independence and to exert political pressure on monetary policy.

It is worthwhile to take a step back and ask what is meant by accountability. Colloquially and in academic literature, the term accountability has become "an ever-expanding concept." Accountability does not mean that the Fed needs to please every member of Congress, or even some of them, all the time. If it did, there would be no point in having an independent central bank! So what does accountability mean?  A useful synonym is answerability. The Fed's accountability to Congress means the Fed must answer to Congress-- this requires, of course, that Congress ask something of the Fed. David Wessel explains that this can be a problem:

Congress is having a hard time fulfilling its responsibilities to hold the Fed accountable. Too few members of Congress know enough to ask good questions at hearings where the Fed chair testifies. Too many view hearings as a way to get themselves on TV or to score political points against the other party.

Accountability, in the sense of answerability, is a two-way street requiring effort on the parts of both the Fed and Congress. Recent efforts by Congress to impose "accountability" would clear Congress of the more onerous part of its task. The Federal Reserve Accountability and Transparency Act introduced in 2014 would require that the Fed adopt a rules-based policy. The legislation states that "Upon determining that plans…cannot or should not be achieved, the Federal Open Market Committee shall submit an explanation for that determination and an updated version of the Directive Policy Rule.”

In 1976, Senator Hubert Humphrey made a similar proposal: the president would submit recommendations for monetary policy, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors would have to explain any proposed deviation within fifteen days. This proposal did not pass, but other legislation in the late 1970s did change the Federal Reserve's objectives and standards for accountability. Prompted by high inflation, the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 made price stability an explicit policy goal. Representative Augustus Hawkins and Senator Humphrey introduced the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, also known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, which added a full employment goal and obligated the Fed Chair to make biannual reports to Congress. It was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on October 27, 1978.

The Humphrey-Hawkins Act, though initially resisted by FOMC members, did improve the Fed's accountability or answerability to Congress. The requirement of twice-yearly reports to Congress literally required the Fed Chair to answer Congress' questions (though likely, for a time, in "Fed Speak.") The outlining of the Fed's policy goals defined the scope of what Congress should ask about. In terms of the Fed's communication strategy with Congress, its format, broadly, is question-and-answer. Its content is the Federal Reserve's mandates. Its tone--clear or obfuscatory, helpful or hostile--has varied over time and across Fed officials and members of Congress. 

Since 1978, changes to the communication strategy, such as the announcement of a 2% long-run goal for PCE inflation in 2012, have attempted to facilitate the Fed's answerability to Congress. The proposal to require that the Fed follow a rule-based policy goes beyond the requirements of accountability. The Fed must be accountable for the outcomes of its policy, but that does not mean restricting the flexibility of its actions. Unusual or extreme economic conditions require discretion on the part of monetary policymakers, which they must be prepared to explain as clearly as possible. 

Janet Yellen remarked in 2013 that "By the eve of the recent financial crisis, it was established that the FOMC could not simply rely on its record of systematic behavior as a substitute for communication--especially under unusual circumstances, for which history had little to teach" [emphasis added]. Imposing systematic behavior in the form of rules-based policy is an even poorer substitute. As monetary begins to normalize, Congress' role in monetary policy is to question the Fed, not to bully it.

Regime Change From Roosevelt to Rousseff

I've written another post for the Berkeley Center for Latin American Studies blog:

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected in October 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression. High unemployment, severely depressed spending, and double-digit deflation plagued the economy. Shortly after his inauguration in March 1933, a dramatic turnaround occurred. Positive inflation was restored, and 1933 to 1937 was the fastest four-year period of output growth in peacetime in United States history. 

How did such a transformation occur? Economists Peter Temin and Barrie Wigmore attribute the recovery to a “regime change.” In the economics literature, regime change refers to the idea that a set of new policies can have major effects by rapidly and sharply changing expectations. A regime change can occur when a policymaker credibly commits to a new set of policies and goals.... 

In short, Roosevelt stated and proved that he was willing to do whatever it would take to end deflation and restore economic growth. As Roosevelt proclaimed on October 22, 1933: “If we cannot do this one way, we will do it another. Do it, we will.” 

Almost all politicians promise change but few manage such drastic transformation. In Brazil’s closely contested presidential election this October, incumbent President Dilma Rousseff won reelection with a three-point margin over centrist candidate Aecio Neves. Rouseff told supporters, “I know that I am being sent back to the presidency to make the big changes that Brazilian society demands. I want to be a much better president than I have been until now.” 

Rousseff’s rhetoric of “big changes” refers in large part to the Brazilian economy, which is plagued with stagnant growth, high inflation, and a strained federal budget. Brazil’s currency, the real, hit a nine-year low following Rousseff’s victory, and the stock market also tumbled. This market tumult reflects investors’ doubts about the Rousseff administration’s intention and ability to enact effective reforms. Investors viewed Neves as the pro-business, anti-interventionist candidate and are unconvinced that Rousseff will act decisively to restore fiscal discipline and rein in inflation. In other words, Rousseff’s talk of change is not fully credible in the way that Roosevelt’s was... 

Though Rousseff is taking some actions to improve business conditions, restore fiscal discipline, and reduce inflation, the problem is that they are being enacted quietly and reluctantly rather than being trumpeted as part of a broader vision of reform. The key to regime change is that the effects of policy changes depend crucially on how the changes are presented and perceived. Economic policies work not only through direct channels but also through signaling and expectations. For example, a small rise in fuel prices and a reduction in state bank subsidized lending may have small direct effects, but if they are viewed as signals that the president is wholeheartedly embracing market-friendly reforms, the effects will be much greater. So far, despite Rousseff’s campaign slogan — “new government, new ideas” — she hasn’t credibly committed to a new regime.

Read the complete article and my pre-election Brazil article at the CLAS blog.

Reading Keynes at the Zero Lower Bound

The Berkeley Economic History Lab working paper series has recently put up a new paper by Richard Sutch, "The Liquidity Trap, the Great Depression, and Unconventional Policy: Reading Keynes at the Zero Lower Bound." From the abstract:

The developed economies of Japan, the United States, and the Eurozone are currently experiencing very low short-term rates, so low that they are considered to be at the “zero lower bound” of possibility. This effectively paralyzes conventional monetary policy. As a consequence, monetary authorities have turned to unconventional and controversial policies such as “Quantitative Easing,” “Maturity Extension,” and “Low for Long Forward Guidance.” John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory offered a rich analysis of the problems that appear at the zero lower bound and advocated the very same unconventional policies that are now being pursued. Keynes’s comments on these issues are rarely mentioned in the current discussions because the subsequent simplifications and the bowdlerization of his model obliterated this detail. It was only later that his characterization of a lower bound to interest rates would be dubbed a “Liquidity Trap.” This essay employs Keynes’s analysis to retell the economic history of the Great Depression in the United States. Keynes’s rationale for unconventional policies and his expectations of their effect remain surprisingly relevant today. I suggest that in both the Depression and the Great Recession the primary impact on interest rates was produced by lowering expectations about the future path of rates rather than by changing the risk premiums that attach to yields of different maturities. The long sustained period when short term rates were at the lower bound convinced investors that rates were likely to remain near zero for several more years. In both cases the treatment proved to be very slow to produce a significant response, requiring a sustained zero-rate policy for four years or longer.

Sutch notes that "the General Theory is a notoriously unreadable book, one that required others to interpret and popularize its message." Since Keynes did not use the phrase "liquidity trap"--it was coined by Dennis Robertson in 1940--interpreting Keynes' policy prescriptions in a liquidity trap is contentious. Sutch reinterprets the theory of the liquidity trap from the General Theory, then examines the impact of Federal Reserve and Treasury policies during the Great Depression in light of his interpretation.

Sutch outlines Keynes' three theoretical reasons why an effective floor to long-term interest rates might be encountered at the depth of a depression:

(1) Since the term structure of interest rates will rise with maturity when short-term rates are low, a point might be reached where continued open-market purchases of shortterm government debt would reduce the short-term rate to zero before producing a sufficient decline in the risk-free long-term rate [Keynes 1936: 201-204 and 233]. 

(2) It is, at least theoretically, possible that the demand for money (called “liquidity preference” by Keynes) could become “virtually absolute” at a sufficiently low longterm interest rate and, if so, then increases in the money supply would be absorbed completely by hoarding [Keynes 1936: 172 and 207-208]. 

(3) The default premiums included as a portion of the interest charged on business loans and on the return to corporate securities could become so great that it would prove impossible to bring down the long-term rate of interest relevant for business decisions even though the risk-free long-term rate was being reduced by monetary policy [Keynes 1936: 144-145].

The first two reasons, Sutch notes, are often conflated  because of a tendency in the post-Keynesian literature to drop short-term assets from the model. The third reason, called "lender's risk," is typically neglected in textbooks and empirical studies.

In Keynes' view, the Great Depression was triggered by a collapse in investment in 1929, prior to the Wall Street crash in the fall, as “experience was beginning to show that borrowers could not really hope to earn on new investment the rates which they had been paying” and “even if some new investment could earn these high rates, in the course of time all the best propositions had got taken up, and the cream was off the business.” Keynes maintained that a reduction in the long-term borrowing rate, to low levels would be required to stimulate investment after the collapse of the demand curve for investment. He suggested that the long-term borrowing rate has three components: (1) the pure expectations component, (2) the risk premium, and (3) the default premium.

Sutch goes on to interpret the zero lower bound episodes of 1932, April 1934-December 1936 and April 1938-December 1939 according to Keynes' theory. He concludes that the primary impact of unconventional monetary policy on interest rates was through lowering expectations about the future path of rates rather than by changing the risk premiums on yields of different maturities---but this impact was very slow. Sutch also concludes that a similar interpretation of recent unconventional monetary policy is appropriate. He notes four main similarities between the Great Depression and the Great Recession:

...the collapse of demand for new fixed investment, the role of the zero lower bound in hampering conventional monetary policy, the multi-year period of near-zero short term rates, and the protracted period of subnormal prosperity during the respective recoveries. A major difference between then and now is that in the current situation the monetary authorities are actively pursuing large-scale purchases of long-term government securities and mortgage-backed assets. This is the primary monetary policy that Keynes advocated for a depressed economy at the zero lower bound. This policy was not attempted during the Great Depression and it is unclear whether the backdoor QE engineered by the Treasury was an adequate substitute. 

While the current monetary activism is to be welcomed, Quantitative Easing then and now appears to be slow acting. In both regimes recovery came only after multiple painful years during which uncertainly damped optimism. Improvement came only after multiple years during which many lives were seriously marred by unemployment and many businesses experienced or were threatened with bankruptcy...Keynes opened his series of Chicago lectures in 1931 expressing the fear that, just possibly, "… when this crisis is looked back upon by the economic historian of the future it will be seen to mark one of the major turning-points. For it is a possibility that the duration of the slump may be much more prolonged than most people are expecting and that much will be changed, both in our ideas and in our methods, before we emerge. Not, of course, the duration of the acute phase of the slump, but that of the long, dragging conditions of semislump, or at least subnormal prosperity which may be expected to succeed the acute phase." [Keynes 1931: 344]

If you are interested in reading narrative evidence from Keynes' writing, the entire working paper is worth your time.

Lance Davis (1928-2014)

Lance Edwin Davis passed away this week. A renowned economic historian with major contributions in financial history and institutional economics, Davis was a professor at Caltech from 1968 to 2005.

Davis is associated with cliometrics, a quantitative and systematic approach to analyzing economic history. The term cliometrics--combining Clio, the muse of history, with metrics from econometrics--was coined in the 1950s by a group of economic historians and mathematical economists at Purdue University. Davis was a key member of this group, along with Jonathan Hughes and Stanley Reiter. This group obtained funds from Purdue to start a new conference series, originally called the Conference on the Application of Economic Theory and Quantitative Methods to the Study of Problems of Economic History, and later called the Cliometric Conference, or just Clio.

The Cliometrics Conferences helped bring about a renewal in the economic history field. The new generation of economic historians in the 1950s and 60s began integrating economic theory and empirical evidence more rigorously and creatively than before. Often, this involved extensive efforts to uncover and tabulate historical data. Davis and Louis Stettler's "The New England Textile Industry, 1825-60: Trends and Fluctuations" (1966) is an example of this type of work.

Davis' efforts to integrate theory and empirical evidence are particularly valuable in the area of financial history. In "The Investment Market, 1870-1914: The Evolution of a National Market" (1965), Davis notes that the classical assumption of perfect capital mobility implies that rates of return on capital should be equal across regions and industries. Interest rate differentials provide information about the barriers to capital mobility. Davis' paper gathers data on interest rate differentials among six regions of the United States from 1870-1914 and analyzes the institutional innovations that reduced barriers to capital mobility over that period.

The cliometric approach also brought about a new way of thinking about economic institutions and institutional change. Neoclassical institutional theory flourished in the 1960s, led by Davis and Douglass North, who developed a model of the logic and incentives that shape the institutional environment. Davis and North's hugely influential book, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (1971), outlines their model and applies it to American economic history.

In other work, Davis focuses on British financial markets and British imperialism. He and Robert Huttenback wrote the book Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (1986). They examine the economics of imperialism, including the returns on investment in empire-building and the social costs of maintaining the empire. The analysis portrays British imperialism as a mechanism to that transferred income from the tax-paying middle class to the elites.

Among Davis' other works are In Pursuit of Leviathan: Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906 (1997) with Robert Gallman and Karin Gleiter, and Evolving Financial Markets and International Capital Flows: Britain, the Americas, and Australia, 1870–1914 (2001) with Robert Gallman.

An interview with Davis in 1998 is full of interesting stories about his life and work, including his naval service in WWII and the Korean War. The interview tells of his role shaping the Caltech social sciences division. He was there when Caltech admitted its first social sciences PhD student, Barry Weingast, in 1974. There is a strong sense of community among economic historians in California, of which Davis was a central part.

The Economic Exhortation of Pope Francis

I'm glad to see Pope Francis' apostolic exhortation Evangelii Guardium featured so prominently in the media. With a 224-page document and a 2000 year Church history, however, media coverage is bound to include some oversimplifications. One is the title of Emma Green's piece in the Atlantic, "The Vatican's Journey From Anti-Communism to Anti-Capitalism." While the article includes a lot of good information, it does oversimplify historical Church teaching on the economy. Green writes:

Throughout 224 pages on the future of the Church, he condemns income inequality, “the culture of prosperity,” and “a financial system which rules rather than serves.” 

Taken in the context of the last half-century of Roman Catholicism, this is a radical move. Fifty years ago, around the time of the Second Vatican Council, Church leaders quietly declared a very different economic enemy: communism. But Pope Francis’s communitarian, populist message shows just how far the Church has shifted in five decades—and how thoroughly capitalism has displaced communism as a monolithic political philosophy.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, published in 1992, "presents Catholic doctrine within the context of the Church's history and tradition." According to the Catechism,

2425 The Church has rejected the totalitarian and atheistic ideologies associated in modem times with "communism" or "socialism." She has likewise refused to accept, in the practice of "capitalism," individualism and the absolute primacy of the law of the marketplace over human labor. Regulating the economy solely by centralized planning perverts the basis of social bonds; regulating it solely by the law of the marketplace fails social justice, for "there are many human needs which cannot be satisfied by the market. Reasonable regulation of the marketplace and economic initiatives, in keeping with a just hierarchy of values and a view to the common good, is to be commended.

The Church has a long history of rejecting both communism and capitalism in their pure forms. The Catechism elaborates on private property:

2403 The right to private property, acquired or received in a just way, does not do away with the original gift of the earth to the whole of mankind. The universal destination of goods remains primordial, even if the promotion of the common good requires respect for the right to private property and its exercise. 

2404 "In his use of things man should regard the external goods he legitimately owns not merely as exclusive to himself but common to others also, in the sense that they can benefit others as well as himself." The ownership of any property makes its holder a steward of Providence, with the task of making it fruitful and communicating its benefits to others, first of all his family. 

2405 Goods of production - material or immaterial - such as land, factories, practical or artistic skills, oblige their possessors to employ them in ways that will benefit the greatest number. Those who hold goods for use and consumption should use them with moderation, reserving the better part for guests, for the sick and the poor. 

2406 Political authority has the right and duty to regulate the legitimate exercise of the right to ownership for the sake of the common good.

The following passages concerning economic activity and profit are also quite relevant:

2423 ...Any system in which social relationships are determined entirely by economic factors is contrary to the nature of the human person and his acts. 

2424 A theory that makes profit the exclusive norm and ultimate end of economic activity is morally unacceptable. The disordered desire for money cannot but produce perverse effects. It is one of the causes of the many conflicts which disturb the social order. 

2425 A system that "subordinates the basic rights of individuals and of groups to the collective organization of production" is contrary to human dignity. Every practice that reduces persons to nothing more than a means of profit enslaves man, leads to idolizing money, and contributes to the spread of atheism. "You cannot serve God and mammon." 

These passages from the Catechism are based on a long history of Catholic teaching on economic justice, including Encyclicals from the Popes. Quadragesimo Anno, for example, written by Pope Pius XI in 1931, responded to economic conditions and inequality following the Great Depression. More recently, Pope Benedict in Caritas in Veritate stated that "Profit is useful if it serves as a means towards an end that provides a sense both of how to produce it and how to make good use of it. Once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty."

I am very grateful for Pope Francis' exhortation. I do not think it represents a radical shift in Church teaching, but rather a renewed and louder cry for the teaching to be taken seriously. His cries that "The dignity of each human person and the pursuit of the common good are concerns which ought to shape all economic policies." I hope the world will listen.

Argentine Inflation Saga Approaches Critical Moment

Argentina's time is up. In February, the IMF censured Argentina on account of its notoriously dubious inflation statistics. Under terms of the censure, Argentina was given until September 29, 2013, to improve the flawed data. The deadline has passed, and IMF Chief Christine Lagarde will report to the IMF Executive Board by November 13 on Argentina's progress (or, likely, lack thereof.)

Lagarde's impending report follows a long and nearly unbelievable saga (see timeline at the end of this post.) The gist of the matter is that officially-reported inflation has been in the vicinity of 10% for the past few years, while a variety of private estimates place the true value at 25% or higher. Oh, and the independent economists who publish these private estimates are threatened with criminal prosecution. This September, economist Orlando Ferreres published his estimate that June monthly inflation was 1.9%, compared to the official estimate of 0.8% (with compounding, that's a big difference) and could face a two-year prison sentence. I searched for Ferreres' website on November 3, and it appears to have been hacked (see image below.) I could not find Ferreres' independent inflation estimates on his site; only official estimates appear.

Red flags were raised in earnest in 2007, when then-President Néstor Kirchner dismissed several staff statisticians at INDEC, the statistics institute that publishes the official consumer-price index (CPI) for Argentina. The government takeover of INDEC included the demotion of Graciela Bevacqua, director of the inflation index, who had prepared the inflation data for six years. In 2005, Bevacqua estimated that inflation was over 12% and rising. Bevacqua says that Interior Commerce Secretary Guillermo Moreno began pressuring her to underreport inflation data in May 2006. From then until her demotion, Moreno harassed her unrelentlessly, challenging her data and methodology and demanding more "favorable" estimates. Bevacqua refused to comply, resulting in her demotion and eventual resignation from government.

The 2007 Presidential elections certainly contributed to the pressure for more "favorable" inflation data. With Kirchner's appointees in place at INDEC, end-of-year inflation "fell" from 12.3% in 2005 to 9.8% in 2006 to 8.5% in 2007. Christina Fernandez de Kirchner, wife of Néstor Kirchner, was elected President. After the elections, the data manipulation had to continue, to cover the previous manipulation.

In Argentina, inflation statistics have political significance that extends even deeper than their economic significance, as is common in countries with a history of hyperinflation. In the 1970s, like several other Latin American countries, Argentina borrowed heavily to fund its industrialization efforts. A variety of factors combined to exacerbate a debt crisis in the 1980s, which was accompanied by high inflation in Argentina and neighboring countries. Argentina faced quadruple-digit inflation in 1989 and 1990, with a hyperinflationary peak in March 1990. The disastrous consequences of hyperinflation, including stagnation of growth and capital flight, prompted structural reforms in the 1990s, under direction of the IMF, which restored inflation to low levels. For a time, Argentina was viewed as a model of success.

The situation in Argentina took a turn for the worse around the time of the Brazilian devaluation in 1999. A protracted recession erased most of the decade's gains in poverty reduction. As the federal government deficit widened to 2.5% of GDP in 1999, the IMF advised the De la Rúa administration to implement austerity measures. Distress escalated to full-scale crisis, climaxing with the largest debt default in history in December 2001. Following the default, Argentina faced exclusion from international capital markets and 41% inflation in 2002. Legal battles with a subset of the bondholders continue to this day.

With this history, it is not surprising that both inflation and IMF relations are sensitive issues for Argentina. Bevacqua says that Secretary Moreno "said that if we didn’t aim for zero inflation, we were unpatriotic.” The  irony is that the deceptive data, intended to improve appearances, fooled no one, and made the country look worse rather than better. Consumers in Argentina are well aware that inflation is several times the official rate. A consumer survey run by Torcuato di Tella University has measured inflation expectations near 30% for several years.

Source: Torcuato di Tella University. Yellow bars indicate median expectation and gray line indicates mean expectation.

MIT economist Alberto Cavallo published an investigation into Argentina's official price index in the widely-read Journal of Monetary Economics in 2012. Here is the abstract:

Prices collected from online retailers can be used to construct daily price indexes that complement official statistics. This paper studies their ability to match official inflation estimates in five Latin American countries, with a focus on Argentina, where official statistics have been heavily criticized in recent years. The data were collected between October 2007 and March 2011 from the largest supermarket in each country. In Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, online price indexes approximate both the level and main dynamics of official inflation. By contrast, Argentina’s online inflation rate is nearly three times higher than the official estimate.

Cavallo suggests that "the way the data is being altered is far simpler than commonly assumed. INDEC is a large organization, with many employees involved with the data collection and construction of the price indexes. Instead of changing the prices at the item level, it is probably easier for the government to change the aggregate numbers, which are seen by just a handful of people at the end of the CPI calculation process."

He adds, in conclusion, that "There is no obvious reason for why the government continues to manipulate the official price indexes. Some economists point to lower interest payments for inflation-linked bonds, while others highlight the fact that, by using artificially low inflation estimates in the budget, the government can avoid distributing any excess tax income to the provinces. However, these short-term resources are negligible next to the negative effects and uncertainty the manipulation has introduced in the economy."

Regarding Argentina's inflation-linked bonds, doubts about data accuracy began to wipe away their market in 2007. Argentina originally issued inflation-linked bonds in 1973, and the "linkers" came to play a large role in public debt management. Even as late as 2009, a third of Argentine debt was linked to inflation. But in September 2009, Argentina launched a new bond, the Bonar 2015, as part of a debt swap that replaced much of the inflation-indexed paper.

The collapse of Argentina's inflation-indexed bond market, though destructive, pales in comparison to the harms that have been inflicted on workers and consumers. A government-imposed price freeze implemented in February, and another in June, appear unsurprisingly ineffective. The mismatch between official data and generally perceived cost-of-living increases makes satisfactory wage negotiations between trade unions and the Ministry of Labor impossible. Erosion of purchasing power is likely much worse in the informal sector, which accounts for an estimated 40% of Argentine workers. In addition, strict capital controls fuel a large currency black market.

Lagarde describes the IMF censure of Argentina as a "yellow card." When Lagarde makes her report to the IMF Executive Committee later this month, if the data is not suitable, she will give a "red card." It is not clear how harmful any potential IMF sanctions could be. Argentina is already the only Group of 20 country that refuses to allow the IMF to conduct an annual review of the economy known as the Article IV consultation, and may not be overly concerned with further deterioration of relations with the IMF. A likely, if unsatisfactory, outcome is some knuckle-rapping and maintenance of the status quo for all practical purposes. The IMF could suspend Argentina's voting and related rights and begin the process of compulsory withdrawal from the fund. A top international priority should be the minimization of contagion to other emerging markets-- which should be possible, since the situation is sufficiently Argentina-specific. The way out of the mess in Argentina is difficult to foresee. The way into the mess is outlined in the timeline below.

Timeline

1970s: Argentina borrows heavily to fund industrialization efforts.

1973: Argentina issues inflation-indexed bonds.

1980s: Argentine inflation heats up in the midst of Latin American debt crisis.

March 1990: Argentina's hyperinflation reaches peak.

1990s: Argentina implements IMF-directed structural reforms.

1998-2002: Argentina suffers severe recession.

June 31, 2001: Argentina swaps $29.5 billion of debt and defers $7.8 billion in interest payments. 

December 5, 2001: IMF announces it will not release $1.3 billion in aid to Argentina because austerity measures are insufficient.

December 23, 2001: Argentina defaults on $100 billion in debt.

May 25, 2003: Néstor Kirchner becomes President, succeeding Carlos Menem.

2007: Kirchner replaces several statisticians at INDEC with political appointees.

December 10, 2007: Christina Fernandez de Kirchner becomes President.

September 2, 2009: Argentina swaps 16.7 billion pesos ($4.34 billion) of inflation-linked bonds for newly-issued 2014 and 2015 bonds to extend maturities and reduce financing costs.

January 2010: Standoff between Central Bank President Martín Redrado and President Kirchner over use of central bank reserves to pay debt. Redrado is fired, then reinstated by courts.

January 30, 2010: Central Bank President Redrado resigns. Redrado accuses government of data manipulation.

February 3, 2010: Mercedes Marcó del Pont appointed President of Central Bank.

February 1, 2012: IMF Executive Board gives Argentina 180 days to implement specific measures to address quality of inflation data.

September 17, 2012: IMF Executive Board determines Argentina has made insufficient progress in implementing remedial measures.

February 1, 2013: IMF Executive Board censures Argentina.

February 4, 2013: Argentina announces two-month price freeze.

September 29, 2013: Deadline for Argentina to address concerns with inflation and GDP data.

November 13, 2013: Deadline for Christine Lagarde's report to IMF Executive Board on Argentina's progress.

Academic Scribblers and the History of Inflation-Protected Securities

In most financial and economic analysis, U.S. Treasuries play the role of the "risk-free" asset. They are risk-free to an approximation only. In particular, since Treasury bonds are nominal, and future inflation is not known with certainty, they carry some inflation risk. Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS), like Treasuries, are backed by the full faith and credit of the US government, but are also linked to the Consumer Price Index, reducing inflation risk.

TIPS have a surprisingly interesting history, one that is both longer and shorter than you might expect. Though inflation-indexed bonds made a brief-lived appearance in Massachusetts in 1780, they then disappeared for more than two centuries. TIPS were not issued until 1997, at the urging of then Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. This is the first of a series of posts I will write about inflation-indexed securities. In this post, I describe their history. In future posts I will review the evidence on whether TIPS have lived up to Rubin's claims that they would benefit savers and reduce the government's borrowing costs, as well as exploring other implications of this teenage asset.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts created the earliest known inflation-indexed bonds in 1780 in the Revolutionary War. Robert Shiller writes, "These bonds were invented to deal with severe wartime inflation and with angry discontent among soldiers in the U.S. Army with the decline in purchasing power of their pay. Although the bonds were successful, the concept of indexed bonds was abandoned after the immediate extreme inflationary environment passed, and largely forgotten until the twentieth century."

Commonwealth of Massachusetts inflation-indexed bond, 1780, from Shiller (2003).

The 1780 bond reads,

"Both Principal and Interest to be paid in the then current Money of said STATE, in a greater or less SUM, according as Five Bushels of CORN, Sixty-eight Pounds and four-seventh Parts of a Pound of BEEF, Ten Pounds of SHEEPS WOOL, and Sixteen Pounds of SOLE LEATHER shall then cost, more or less than One Hundred and Thirty Pounds current money, at the then current Prices of said ARTICLES—This SUM being THIRTY-TWO TIMES AND AN HALF what the same Quantities of the same Articles would cost at the Prices affixed to them in the Law of this STATE made in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-seven, intitled, 'An Act to prevent Monopoly and Oppression.'"

Thus, the bond functioned similarly to today's TIPS, which are also linked to the price of a market basket of goods (the CPI). Shiller notes that the price index described on the 1780 bond increased 32-fold in three years. The inflation-linked bonds allowed soldiers' pay to keep pace with rising prices. (Curiously, the President of Harvard College, Samuel Langdon, also had his pay linked to this index.) With no explanation, an act in 1786 ended the experiment with indexed bonds.

Shiller explains that this historic episode is a good example of the role of economic theory in financial innovation. "John Maynard Keynes is widely quoted as asserting that most economic innovations derive ultimately from some 'academic scribblers.' But, in fact, in the case of indexed bonds, there was no academic precursor." He adds,

"It seems here that necessity was the mother of this invention. The example of the creation of indexed bonds in Massachusetts in 1780 appears to deny the importance of the “academic scribblers” that Keynes extolled, for the invention appeared long before the scholars wrote about it. And yet, in another sense, it only reinforces their importance, for the practice of indexation of bonds did not take hold at that time. It is a reasonable supposition that the indexed bonds did not continue because there was no well-conceived model that would justify and explain them."

Certain developments in index number theory, for example, did not take place until the twentieth century. A simple price index like the one used on the 1780 bond has what is now a well-known problem. If the price of one of the goods rises, consumers can shift some of their consumption to other goods. Because of the ability to substitute, the increase in the price index is more than the increase in the true cost of living. Irving Fischer proposed a solution in 1922.

It wasn't until later in the twentieth century that inflation-indexed government bonds reappeared. This time around, academic scribblers abounded. The UK was a much earlier adopter than the US. On the recommendation of the Wilson Committee Report of 1980, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe announced the Government's intention to issue index-linked gilts.

Other countries, including Canada, Sweden, and New Zealand, followed in subsequent years. Whereas the high inflation in the Revolutionary War prompted inflation-indexed government debt, the high inflation in the US in the late 1970s did not have the same effect, at least not immediately. Shiller became one of the academic scribblers, coauthoring "A Scorecard for Indexed Government Debt" with John Campbell in 1996. Their scorecard came out in favor of creating inflation-indexed government debt. TIPS were introduced in 1997, and have since grown as a share of debt and of GDP (see figure below).

Source: Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira 2009

Campbell and Shiller enumerated multiple potential upsides and downsides to TIPS in their 1996 report. I plan to delve into these in future posts (perhaps at Noahpinion, where I've been guest blogging lately).

(Since I'm writing about finance, I should add the disclaimer that this is not intended to be investment advice.)

Capital is Back: Wealth Ratios over Several Centuries

This afternoon I attended a seminar called "Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010" by Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman. From the abstract:

"How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970-2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200-300% in 1970 to 400-600% in 2010. In effect, today’s ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600-700%). This can be explained by a long run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth...Our results have important implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares."

The authors put together a new macro-historical data set on wealth and income, available online, which is "the first international database to include long-run, homogeneous information on national wealth...It can be used to study core macroeconomic questions – such as private capital accumulation, the dynamics of the public debt, and patterns in net foreign asset positions – altogether and over unusually long periods of time."

They suggest that from the interwar period until the 1870s, asset prices were depressed. Then an asset price recovery was driven by changes in capital policies. A U-shaped history of wealth-income ratios is more pronounced for Europe than for the US (Figure 4).

The following two figures show the changing nature of national wealth in the UK (Figure 3) and the US (Figure 10). (The picture for France is quite similar to the UK.) Agricultural land accounted for a staggering 400% of national income in 1870 in the UK, and is basically negligible now. The picture for the US changes if you include slaves as wealth in the antebellum period (Figure 11).

The author also decompose the accumulation of national wealth from 1970-2010 into a saving-induced wealth growth rate and a capital-gains-induced wealth growth rate for eight rich countries (Table 4). Germany is the only country to have experienced a negative capital-gains-induced wealth growth rate.

In Figure 16, below, Piketty and Zucman make a variety of assumptions to compute and simulate the worldwide private wealth to national income ratio from 1870-2100. The ratio bottomed-out in 1950, and they predict that it will continue to rise. This means, they suggest, that wealth inequality is likely to matter more now than in the postwar period, and will continue to matter even more in the future, raising a new set of issues about capital regulation and taxation.

This Time is Not So Different: The Euro Crisis and the 1840s

In the United States, the 1840s were "an era of fiscal crisis following a decade of fiscal exuberance," according to a paper by Arthur Grinath, JohnWallis, and Richard Sylla. This paper was written in 1997, but its insights into a sovereign debt crisis of long ago provide interesting parallels to today.

In the 1820s and 1830s, state governments made large investments in canals, railroads, and banks. New York and Ohio were the first two states to start canal projects. At first, the expected revenue from the projects was low or uncertain, so New York and Ohio raised taxes to service the canal debt. But the Erie and Ohio canals were highly successful, so subsequent canal construction was financed without corresponding tax increases. New York, Ohio, and other states expected internal improvement projects to produce future revenue, so they didn't feel the need to raise taxes when they began new projects. States were easily able to issue bonds to domestic and foreign (especially British) investors to finance their projects:

“Both state borrowers and lenders, foreign and domestic, anticipated that states could tax land if their bank and transportation projects failed. After 1836, increasing land values and taxable acreage were the common factor underlying state fiscal policies, bank investments, and transportation improvements nationwide. Northeastern states knew they had large amounts of untaxed land, rising in value. It was a fiscal reserve against which they could borrow to finance extensions of their transportation systems. Western states, north and south, were in the midst of the greatest land boom in American history. If northwestern states were uncertain about just when transportation investments would generate revenues, they nonetheless anticipated that many more, and more valuable, acres could soon be taxed. States were thus confident that property tax proceeds would provide adequate fiscal resources to service the debts they incurred. Investors in state bonds concurred.”

State government bonds were considered safe assets because it seemed inconceivable that a state government could default-- their investments were expected to be profitable, and even if they weren't, the states had plenty of potential to increase their tax revenue, especially since land value was rising. Grinath et al. quote Illinois Governor Ford as saying "Mere possibilities appeared to be highly probable, and probabilities wore the livery of certainty itself.”

Gary Gorton, Stefan Lewellen, and Andrew Metrick define a safe asset as one that is information-insensitive. "To the extent that debt is information-insensitive, it can be used efficiently as collateral in financial transactions, a role in finance that is analogous to the role of money in commerce." Gorton elaborates on this idea in an interview with the Region magazine, explaining that debt is "easiest to trade if you’re sure that neither party knows anything about the payoff on the debt." In other words, "The depositors believe that the collateral has the feature that nobody has any private information about it. We can all just believe that it’s all AAA."

In the 1830s, both the states and the investors in state bonds could "believe that it's all AAA" since, even if investment projects turned out not to generate much revenue, states had seemingly boundless untapped tax potential. Thus it was unnecessary for investors in state bonds to find information about the details of states' particular projects. State debt was information-insensitive, a useful property considering how slowly information traveled across the Atlantic in those days.  No need to calculate probabilities when probabilities wear the "livery of certainty itself."

Gorton says that the few really big crisis events in history come from a regime switch in which debt that is information-insensitive becomes information-sensitive. This is precisely what happened in the U.S. states. During the early 1830s expansion and boom of 1835, state debt was information-insensitive, especially as ever-rising land prices promised a large and growing fiscal reserve. But as several domestic and external factors combined to bring about the panic of 1837 and collapse of 1839, the strength of the fiscal reserve was challenged. As land values and property taxes fell, the quality of state's canal, bank, and railroad investment projects suddenly mattered for their ability to service their debt. The situation is described in another paper by Wallis and Namsuk Kim:

In July of 1839, the Morris Canal and Banking Company of New Jersey defaulted on Indiana, and the state quickly was forced to curtail construction on its network of canals and railroads. By the autumn, Illinois and Michigan were forced to slow or stop construction when investment banks defaulted on their obligations to the states. Land sales and land values in these northwestern states had been rising steadily through the 1830s. When transportation construction stopped, land values and property tax revenues began falling and, by late 1839, it was apparent that these states would soon have trouble servicing their debts. In January
of 1841, Indiana was the first state to default on interest payments.

It was a nasty spiral-- as infrastructure projects failed, land values and tax revenue fell further, eroding the states' fiscal positions, making it harder for them to issue bonds and forcing them to pay higher interest rates. This further deteriorated their fiscal positions, and led to suspensions of infrastructure projects and yet higher interest rates. This is similar to what happened in the eurozone, for example in Greece. In the early 2000s, Greece was able to run large deficits without facing high borrowing costs, because the growing economy made Greek sovereign debt information-insensitive. The economic crisis was a "regime change" making sovereign debt information-sensitive. Without the benefit of a fast-growing economy, the Greek government's ability to pay depending much more on its fiscal position, so borrowing rates rose, causing an even worse fiscal position.

The parallels with Greece continue. Many states found, when they tried to raise taxes, that they lacked the state capacity to do so. Property taxes were extremely politically unpopular, and states had trouble not only passing tax legislation but also implementing tax collection. In Maryland, for example, three counties refused to remit their share of the property tax imposed in 1841, and seven refused in 1842. It wasn't until 1845 that the tax was effectively implemented, allowing Maryland to resume debt service. Other states were even less successful in raising property taxes and ended up defaulting and repudiating their debt. Greece also faces a tax evasion problem and encountered serious public and political opposition to attempted austerity measures. In an earlier post I mentioned a paper by Mark Dincecco and Gabriel Katz called "State Capacity and Long Run Performance." State capacity refers a state's ability to tax and to provide public goods and services, called its extractive and productive capabilities, respectively. Dincecco and Katz write:

We argue that the implementation of uniform tax systems at the national level – which we call “fiscal centralization”– enabled European states to effectively fulfill their extractive role. This transformation typically occurred swiftly and permanently from 1789 onward. Similarly, we argue that the establishment of parliaments that could monitor public expenditures at regular intervals – called “limited government” – enabled them to effectively fulfill their productive role. This transformation typically occurred decades after fiscal centralization over the nineteenth century. By the mid-1800s, most European states had achieved “modern” extractive and productive capabilities, implying that they could gather large tax revenues and effectively channel funds toward non-military public services. We argue that these critical improvements in state capacity had strongly positive performance impacts. 

The institutional changes that Dincecco and Katz describe in the late 18th century Europe that brought about extractive capabilities include fiscal centralization and parliamentary, limited government. The U.S. states in the 1840s, and apparently some of the European states today, lack such state capacity, a fact which plays a role in the crises then and now.

Pennsylvania's canals were a financial disaster, so the state faced particularly high borrowing costs, until the Bank of the United States was rechartered as the Bank of the United States Pennsylvania (BUSP). The bank's charter included a promise to underwrite $6 to 8 million in state bond issues. The bank agreed to lend to Pennsylvania at 4%, and as a result, Pennsylvania bond yields in Philadelphia stayed very near to 4% for the next few years. Wallis and Kim write, "Deliberately or not, the BUSP pegged the price of Pennsylvania bonds as a result of its obligations to purchase state bonds over this 18-month period." This is similar to the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) policy, which, by promising to buy sovereign bonds of Eurozone member states, aims to bring down bond yields and lower borrowing costs for countries that face problems selling debt. Though the bank loan program in Pennsylvania was temporarily successful in helping Pennsylvania borrow at lower cost, when the BUSP closed down in 1841, Pennsylvania bond yields jumped immediately, from 6.01% in January 1841 to 9.5% in March.

What ultimately happened in the United States was that the debt crisis forced a change in the structure of public finance. States initiated constitutional restrictions on debt issue and instituted requirements that new spending be matched by new tax increases. The debt crisis in the euro area is also likely to change the structure of public finance, but not in the same way. The United States is both a monetary union and a fiscal union, so even though the states adopted balanced budget amendments, the federal government could still do countercyclical fiscal policy. The euro area is a monetary union without a fiscal union, so it would be very costly for states to institute such restrictions on deficit spending. One possibility is that the euro area will become more of a fiscal and/or banking union; or there may be other changes in the structure of public finance that I can't foresee.

Services and the Slow Economic Recovery

The Berkeley Economic History Laboratory (BEHL) launched a series of working papers earlier this year. The BEHL website notes that "These papers are preliminary works, and their circulation is intended to stimulate discussion and comment." To further that goal, as I mentioned in an earlier post, I'll be spotlighting these working papers on the blog. Three new papers are out; the one I'd like to write about today is called "Goods, Services, and the Pace of Economic Recovery," by Martha Olney and Aaron Pacitti.

The authors cite Lazear and Spletzer's argument that “the problem [with the U.S. economy now] is not that the labor market is underperforming; it is that the recovery has been very slow” (2012 pg. 35). Olney and Pacitti offer an explanation for the slow recovery based on a hypothesis that recoveries from downturns should be slower when services are a larger share of the economy. This comes from the simple idea that goods, and not services, can be produced ahead of an anticipated increase in demand, because only goods can be inventoried. Here is the abstract:

Do service-based economies experience slower economic recoveries than goods-based economies? We argue they do. An economy recovers from a downturn when businesses increase production. Both goods and services can be produced in response to actual demand. But only goods—and not services—can be produced in response to anticipated increases in demand, allowing optimistic forward-looking producers to inventory goods until anticipated buyers appear. Services can’t be inventoried. The more services an economy produces relative to goods, the more production is dependent upon only actual increases in demand, and the slower the recovery. We exploit variation across time and states in the share of services in output. Controlling for the depth of the downturn, the higher is the share of services, the longer is the recovery. Extending our results to the current downturn, given the depth of the downturn, the rise in services alone will make the post-2009 recovery last about 1 year longer than it would have a half-century ago.

The authors use national data for the 10 recessions in the United States from 1948 to 2001, and a panel of state data for 50 states and 5 recessions from 1969 to 2001. They use the depth of each recession as a control variable. Getting the state-level data on service sector shares and business cycles was not an easy feat, and is an important contribution of this research. They are able to document interesting, and changing, variation in the share of services by state. My home state, Kentucky, had the second lowest share of services (39%) in the nation in 1967-1969; the share has risen to 50%. Now oil-rich states Wyoming, Alaska, and Louisiana have the lowest share of services. (Take a look at figure 6 and very cool figure 7 in the paper.)

I am left wondering about the other side of the business cycle. The story in this paper is that businesses can anticipate an increase in demand and build up an inventory. What happens when a decrease in demand is anticipated? Wouldn't goods-producing businesses decrease production and start using up their inventory? This would lengthen the downturn part of the cycle by making it start sooner. If this is the case, service-oriented economies would have longer recoveries and shorter downturns. I don't know if the effect would be asymmetrical. For the state-level data, the authors measure recovery as the length of time from one peak to the next peak of the business cycle. This actually captures the length of the downturn plus recovery. I think it would be preferable to use trough-to-peak length instead of peak-to-peak length if the data allowed it, since share of services could plausibly effect peak-to-trough length and trough-to-peak length in different ways.


Overall, I think this working paper documents an intriguing empirical fact. Has anyone out there read (or written) a macro model with two firms with heterogeneous inventory costs? Please comment or send it my way if you have.Setting the inventory costs of one of the firms to infinity could represent the service sector. I think it would be useful to have a model to go along with this paper-- both to help think about my point in the last paragraph and because I am having trouble thinking about GE implications for relative prices and wages in the goods and services sectors and what role that could play. Any other comments or suggestions on the paper are of course welcome, and I will pass them along to the authors.

Cyprus Levy: Historical Precedents

In 1991, in response to considerable debt management concerns among European nations, Barry Eichengreen wrote a paper called "The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice." A capital levy on wealth-holders with the goal of retiring public debt was perhaps the most controversial proposed solution to the European public debt problem. Eichengreen provides a theoretical framework for considering the effects of such a levy, a list of challenges to successful implementation, a "catalog of failed levies," and an example of an exceptionally successful levy. Eichengreen's framework and lessons from history are useful for considering the levy on savings in Cyprus that is planned as part of Cyprus' 10 billion euro bailout.

Eichengreen's model uses insights from the literature on time consistency and government reputation. If governments could commit to only issuing capital levies under certain circumstances (in technical terms, if capital taxation is a state-contingent claim with full commitment mechanism), then governments could optimally issue levies when government obligations are unusually high, social returns to spending are unusually high, and/or conventional revenues are unusually low. "If the contingencies in response to which the levy is imposed are fully anticipated, independently verifiable, and not under government control," he writes, "then saving and investment should not fall following the imposition of the levy, nor should the government find it more difficult to raise revenues subsequently."

Of course, there are major practical impediments  First, full government commitment technology does not exist. If a government were to precommit to a plan for how its capital taxes would respond to future contingencies, it would end up having an incentive to renege on its commitment. Knowing this, savers would shift their capital to tax havens. Reputational concerns can partially get around this problem. The model describes how a "reputational equilibrium" can result if savers refuse to repatriate their capital for a certain amount of time following a government's decision to renege on its commitment. Another major impediment is the following:

"In a democracy, there is no independent authority to verify to the satisfaction of savers that the realization of the state of the world in fact justifies a capital levy. Even if savers recognize that capital taxation is a contingent claim, they retain the incentive to dispute that the relevant contingency has arisen. Neither is there a mechanism to prevent the government from pursuing policies that strengthen the case for capital taxation -- for example, increasing ordinary expenditures as levy receipts roll in. Savers will accuse the government of succumbing to moral hazard and resist the levy on those grounds... If the levy is imposed at all, typically this will occur only at the end of a protracted and divisive political debate...If there is an extended delay between proposal and implementation of the levy, capital flight is likely to render the measure ineffectual."

In light of these impediments to the successful use of a capital levy, Eichengreen analyzes a number of previous levies, mostly in the aftermath of World War I, and explains why they obtained varying degrees of failure or partially success. His first example, however, is not from post-WWI but rather from the ancient Greeks. They used periodic capital levies of one to four percent which, it is said, were "phenomenally successful because property owners, out of vanity, overstated the value of their assets!" Capital levies were also proposed, but not adopted, following the Napoleonic wars, the Franco-Prussian war, and other periods of major military expenditure. But the end of WWI was the true hey-day of the capital levy.

Italy imposed a capital levy in 1920. The rates ranged from 4.5 to 50 percent; however, payment could be stretched out over 20 years. Thus, it was successful but not too comparable with the Cyprus levy, which would be paid at once. The Czech levy of 1920 is more comparable with the Cyprus levy, and was more successful than levies in Austria, Hungary, and Germany at that time. In Czechoslovakia, a levy on all property was imposed, with progressive rates from 3 to 30 percent, with a separate surtax on the wartime increment up to 40 percent. There are two main reasons this levy was relatively successful. First, the levy fell mainly on a small ethnic German minority, which was unable to mount effective political resistance to delay adoption, so capital flight was minimized. Second, the government budget was structured so that levy revenue was completely separate from day-to-day government operations. The levy was explicitly devoted to extinguishing debts and meeting the special costs of establishing a newly-independent nation. This "lent credibility to claims that the levy was an extraordinary tax whose repetition was unlikely."

Other countries' levies were less successful. In Austria, political delays dragged on so long that asset holders had more than a year to prepare, so capital flight was extensive; moreover, hyperinflation liquidated levy obligations. Similarly, delays in other countries enabled capital flight. In Britain, a levy was long debated but never imposed. Keynes himself weighed in, initially in support of the levy, but later opposing it by the mid twenties, when postwar exceptional circumstances were further in the past.

The Japanese levy after World War II is Eichengreen's example of the exception that proves the rule. It was successful because the typical impediments to success were negated by the exceptional circumstances. Capital flight was limited, and the levy applied primarily to a small minority of individuals considered to have profited greatly from the war. In 1946-47, Japan's sovereignty was severely abridged by occupation forces. Thus "with important elements of democracy in suspension, the levy could be quickly and effectively implemented. One might go further and argue that only when political sovereignty is suspended can the measure be pushed through with such alacrity." Also, since the levy was essentially imposed by outsiders, it did not damage the Japanese government's reputation too much or adversely impact the ability of the Japanese government to raise revenue subsequently.

Lessons for Cyprus

A common theme of levies in the 20th century is that delays, usually politically-induced, cause capital flight and prevent the levy from raising a successful amount of revenue. The Cypriot parliament has already delayed its vote on the deposit levy to Monday. We will see how long the proceedings drag on. In Cyprus,  the levy will fall in large part on foreign depositors, particularly Russians, like the Czech levy fell mainly on Germans. It is not clear whether foreign depositors will prove as unable to mount political resistance in Cyprus as the Germans were in Czechoslovakia.

The levy in Cyprus is progressive, like it was in Czechoslovakia, although not to the same extent. The rate is 6.75% on deposits less than 100,000 euros and 9.9% on larger deposits. According to Eichengreen, a crucially important feature of the successful Japanese levy was the "sociopolitical argument," or the fact that the levy was imposed on people who were seen as having profited unjustly from the war. Engineers of the Cypriot levy may make the case that it is imposed on Russian money launderers or other wealthy depositors funneled their money there for less than admirable reasons. This case might be easier to make if the levy were more progressive-- if it hit bigger accounts harder, and were easier on the small accounts.

The Japanese levy did not adversely impact future Japanese governments' ability to borrow because it was imposed by outsiders. The Cypriot government may also be able to point to the IMF and EU as the masterminds behind this levy. The bigger issue, though, is whether other EU countries will suffer reputational penalties by virtue of association.

Finally, what worked really well for Czechoslovakia was that the levy revenue was totally separated from other tax revenue and dedicated strictly to paying off debt and to the needs of the extraordinary circumstances. It was not used to fund day-to-day operations of the government. That made it seem less likely that the government would be tempted to impose another levy in the near future. That is a feasible option for Cyprus, which they will hopefully employ.