Monday, July 22, 2013

Three Thought-Provoking Central Banking Reads

I have three recommendations for readers interested in central banks and monetary policy. First, my classmate Jeremie Cohen-Setton has started a new blog (together with Tishani Dorfmeister) called ECB Watchers. This blog is great for anyone who watches the Fed too, because the comparative analyses of ECB and Fed policies are quite illuminating. In particular, they have good insights into why the ECB and the Fed will each face serious but different challenges with forward guidance. They explain how the differences stem in part from the Trichet doctrine, which basically holds that non-standard monetary policy measures can “be determined largely independently” from conventional measures. They add:
The intellectual case for such a separation became more fragile, however, as the ECB introduced another set of non-standard measures (LTROs, covered bond programme, Securities Markets Programme and, should it be implemented, the Outright Markets Transactions), which implicitly addressed the second category of problems. By and large, the ECB has remained very shy with measures affecting the structure and risk premia problems (which it consistently saw as bordering fiscal policy) in comparison to the Fed and other central banks.
This relative timidity for touching the risk and term premia can be understood in a multi-country context where monetary policy would inevitably have important distributional consequences. But ECB officials often overplay this aspect. The ECB has eventually been forced to venture in this field and is nervously attempting to rationalize and justify these interventions ex post by explaining that the specific set up of the euro area and in particular the risks of financial fragmentation justified such an approach (see speech by Benoit Coeure at the Banque de France). But this argument is anachronic, because the ECB’s non-standard measures largely predates the financial fragmentation along national boundaries or redenomination risks (covered bond programme, SMP) and because the institutional set up cannot be a sufficiently good reason for the ECB not to undertake what its mandate and its fiduciary duty towards European citizens call for.
My second recommendation is a speech by Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin called "Beyond Capital: The Case for a Harmonized Response to Asset Bubbles." Unfortunately, since she gave the speech on the same day as Chairman Ben Bernanke's testimony on July 17, the speech was under-covered. The bit of coverage that the speech has had mostly just notes that she thinks regulation can stem asset bubbles. But it actually has quite a bit more content. The mechanics of asset bubbles-- why and how they form and grow-- is not clearly understood. But Governor Raskin provides a much clearer and more coherent discussion than I have seen in any previous central banker speech (and I have read quite a lot of them!) Here's a long excerpt-- I'm thrilled to see a central banker actually putting this many words into explaining precisely what they mean by an asset bubble before saying what they want to do about it.
It used to be believed that asset bubbles emerged spontaneously, or perhaps came from sunspots or other mysterious causes. Now we know more and we know better, and, while we may not be able to predict bubbles, we understand them to be a product of particular actions and choices by financial institutions and their regulators.

Here is one way a bubble might start. And, to approximate current economic conditions, we'll assume an environment of interest rates that have been low, and continue to be low, for a long time. To start, retail investors may become dissatisfied with their low yields and begin to seek higher yields by purchasing some specific higher-yielding asset. If investors have access to credit, they might try to raise the return on their money by funding a greater portion of their purchases with debt. The asset purchased could serve to collateralize their loan. If many investors employ this strategy and they borrow to invest in the same asset, the price of that asset, and perhaps the prices of closely related assets as well, will increase noticeably faster than the historical trend.

At the same time, increased demand for credit to finance these asset purchases could lead lenders to increase their reliance on less expensive, unstable short-term funding, such as uninsured deposits, commercial paper, or repo transactions, in order to fund the loans.

Besides meeting customers' growing demands for credit, financial intermediaries may themselves decide to "reach for yield" and take on additional risk in a low interest-rate environment. Banks suffering compressed net interest margins because of low long-term interest rates, money market funds facing an earnings squeeze, insurance companies that had promised minimum rates of return on their products, and others may all begin to take on higher interest rate risk, market risk, liquidity risk, or credit risk in search of higher returns.
If these conditions seem likely to continue, an initial rise in the asset's price leads to expectations of further increases, which adds to investor demand, spurring further borrowing and credit growth and increased household and financial sector leverage, which, in turn, could drive asset prices still higher. Rising asset prices, in turn, would increase the value of borrowers' collateral, allowing still further borrowing.
For loans collateralized by an asset whose price is rising, lenders believe they can rely for repayment more on the appreciation of the asset and collateral and less on the borrower's repayment ability. Lenders relax their underwriting standards, such as minimum requirements for borrower down payments, credit scores and credit history, or required maximum debt-to-income ratios. To compete for loans to buy or to hold the appreciating asset, or financial assets related to it, financial institutions could also decrease the margins and haircuts that usually protect them from asset price declines.
Financial institution decisions to relax underwriting and impose less-stringent margins and haircuts will further increase the pool of potential borrowers and their borrowing capacity, further increasing credit growth and supporting still higher asset prices, but, at the same time, will also increase lenders' credit risks and exposure--as secured creditors--to a decline in the asset's price. Ultimately, the asset becomes severely overvalued, with its price untethered from economic fundamentals. We would then have on our hands a full-blown, credit-fueled asset bubble.
And, as we experienced in the financial crisis, when a bubble involving a widely-held asset bursts, the consequent plunge in asset prices can seriously impair the balance sheets of households and firms. Indeed, a dramatic decline in the price of a significant asset can reduce household wealth, spending, and aggregate demand. When such effects on wealth, credit availability, and aggregate demand are large enough, the real economy can suffer a significant recession. And, of course, lower employment and incomes further depress asset prices and borrowers' ability to repay loans, with further adverse effects on financial institutions and their ability to extend credit.
At this point, some financial institutions may have become nearly insolvent. And this, coupled with their increased reliance on potentially unstable short-term funding, could make them more vulnerable to sudden losses of public confidence.
Such a loss of confidence, in turn, makes it impossible for affected institutions to roll over existing debts or extend new credit, and may force deleveraging that requires selling illiquid assets quickly and cheaply in asset fire sales, resulting in further declines in asset prices. Such developments further threaten the solvency of financial institutions and intensify credit contraction, depriving households and businesses of financing. A loss of confidence that is institution-specific could spread, causing other institutions to experience their own heightened solvency risks, liquidity problems, and need to de-lever through asset sales.
My third recommendation is an old (in blogosphere terms) post by Nick Rowe called "Is money a liability?" I came across it because I'm teaching undergrads about the central bank balance sheet this week (as Rowe was too when he wrote the post.)

Friday, July 19, 2013

Let's Not Invent New Ways to Measure Higher Inflation

Matthew Klein of Bloomberg View has just posted an interesting article called "A Better Way to Measure Inflation." He writes:
Sooner or later, most people end up retiring. You may not be working, but you still need money to eat and live. In the U.S., retirees get some income from Social Security, while Medicare covers their healthcare expenses. These programs by themselves aren't enough for most people, which is why it's a good idea to take some of the money you earn during your working life and use it to buy assets that can be consumed later. 
The amount of money you need to spend on assets to guarantee a given standard of living in retirement is determined by your assets' average yield. The higher the yield on your assets, the less money you need to spend today to get an equivalent amount of money in retirement. Falling yields therefore mean you need to spend more money today to guarantee the same amount of money in the future. In other words, the price of retirement, which is a price almost everyone is exposed to, goes up when yields go down.
The Consumer Price Index calculates inflation as the percent change in the price of a "market basket" of goods and services. Klein implies that the Consumer Price Index understates inflation because retirement is left out of the market basket.

"Consumption smoothing" is the usual name for the fact that people want to spread their consumption across their lifetime more smoothly than their income. For example, when people retire and have little or no income, they still want to consume around the same amount as they did before, as Klein describes. So over the lifecycle, a typical person will try to borrow (reduce their net assets) when their income is low and save (increase their net assets) when their income is high. Interest rates, and correspondingly, yields, figure prominently in the analysis of lifetime consumption.

I am a teaching assistant for undergraduate macroeconomics this summer, and we have been teaching the students a variety of different ways to think about interest rates. One way we explain is that interest rates are like a "price" in the market for loanable funds. They are familiar with supply and demand curves from their prerequisite course, so we show them a graph like this:
Klein, I think, is implying that Fed policy has shifted the supply curve to the right, lowering the real interest rate, making the price of loanable funds lower and in turn making the cost of saving for retirement higher. He pays attention to the second part (the higher price of saving), but not the first part (the lower cost of borrowing.) He says that:
People who already own a lot of assets tend to see things differently. For them, falling yields are great because it means that the value of their savings is rising relative to their other expenses. By contrast, workers struggling to save for retirement have to cut back on current purchases of goods and services in order to cover the added cost of their future liabilities. Rising yields have the opposite effect: it makes the asset-rich feel poorer and makes the asset-poor freer to spend more today.
Monetary policy does have different effects on different people, for a variety of reasons, but not really in the way Klein describes. He is considering only people who are currently increasing their net assets. In terms of lifetime consumption models, these are people who are in a part of their lifecycle when their current income is higher than their expected average future income. (These people have earnings above the red line in the figure below.) What he calls the "asset-rich" and the "asset-poor" do not together make up the entire population-- and a lot of "struggling workers" would not accurately fit into his characterization of the "asset-poor."

Especially when unemployment and underemployment are high, a lot of people's current income is lower than their expected average future income. (Somewhere around the blue star in the figure below.) These people are quite rational to want to spend more than their current income. Rising yields would certainly not make them "freer to spend more today." Klein's "asset-poor" leaves out the people with falling (and in many cases also negative) net assets.  In short, Klein argues that our measured inflation leaves out the price of consumption smoothing, but he only considers the saving part of consumption smoothing, and not the borrowing part.
Image Source: Kotlikoff and Burns (not including blue star)

I hope the Fed does not start finding inflation where it doesn't exist as an excuse to raise rates.

Friday, July 12, 2013

Divided Fed, Broken Models

This week, it has become abundantly clear that the Fed is "deeply divided." In speeches and public communications, FOMC committee members and  Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke have revealed significant differences in their outlooks and intentions for the economy. Tim Duy writes that "The growing division makes it increasingly difficult to think of "the Fed" as a single entity with regards to policy intentions." This is an extremely important point, because most macroeconomic models do consider the Fed as a single entity, and would have different implications if they did not.

Monetary policy is often modeled as a dynamic game in which the two players are the central banker and the public. Typically, the central banker can choose what private information to reveal to the public. Monetary policymakers' preferences and reputational concerns determine their optimal communication strategy in the equilibrium of this dynamic credibility game (see for example Faust and Svensson 2001). Depending on the exact "rules of the game," the optimal strategy turns out to be something less than full information revelation. This game-theoretic political economy paradigm for thinking about monetary policy became hugely influential after seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott in 1977 and Barro in 1986, and has shaped the way economists think about the merits of central bank independence, rules versus discretion, transparency, and explicit inflation targets, with. Insights from this huge literature have been thoroughly integrated into the policymaking sphere.


In reality, of course, in almost every country, monetary policy is not made by a single representative agent, but rather by a committee of very non-representative agents, each with their own, sometimes conflicting, preferences and reputational concerns. With multiple central bankers, monetary policy is a dynamic game between more than two players-- which makes computing optimal strategies dauntingly complex. Strategic behavior between members of the committee will influence each member's communication strategy with the public and with each other. And the public, aware of these strategic interactions, will have quite a complex task computing their best response.

I'm not quite sure where we go from here. One of the most brilliant and famous game theorists, John Nash, proved that non-cooperative games with an arbitrary finite number of players have a Nash equilibrium. But actually finding such an equilibrium is a huge challenge (plus, the non-cooperative assumption is kind of restrictive.) A pair of computer scientists at Berkeley and Stanford note that "even less is known about computing equilibria in multi-player games than in the (still mysterious) special case of two-player games." Even more telling is the title of another paper by Berkeley computer scientists: "Three-Player Games are Hard."

Wednesday, July 3, 2013

Stein, Thoma, and Hamilton on Fed Communication

Mark Thoma describes four ways the Fed is creating harmful uncertainty that could block the economic recovery. A June 28 speech by Jeremy Stein, a member of the Board of Governors, describes Stein's opinions on how the Fed should address two out of the four.

Thoma says that the Fed is creating harmful uncertainty through a botched communication policy concerning when quantitative easing will begin tapering off. "The Fed does not seem to understand how anxious it has appeared to return policy to normal over the last several years," he writes. "Any sign of `Green Shoots,' such as the supposed sighting in 2009 by Chairman Bernanke, prompts the Fed to announce that it is developing an exit strategy. With that background, combined with the public perception that the Fed is itching to reverse course and get back to normal, members of the Fed should not be surprised when markets “misread” talk about when the Fed is planning to reverse course. When Fed communication is adding uncertainty instead of reducing it, that’s a big problem."

Another, related way the Fed is creating uncertainty, Thoma notes, is through its consistently overly-optimistic forecasts: "When things turn out much worse than forecast, the Fed has to reverse itself. It has eased policy after these episodes in some cases and that creates quite a bit of uncertainty over Fed policy."

Stein asserts that both the labor market and the general economic outlook have improved since the start of this round of asset purchases nine months ago, but adds that "this very progress has brought communications challenges to the fore, since the further down the road we get, the more information the market demands about the conditions that would lead us to reduce and eventually end our purchases." In other words, "as we get closer to our goals, the balance sheet uncertainty becomes more manageable – at the same time that the
market’s demand for specificity goes up." This seems roughly true, although I would add that it is not balance sheet uncertainty per se that is the most impactful. I think market participants, in contrast to the consensus among Fed officials, generally care more about the flow of asset purchases than the stock on the balance sheet. In other words, while the Fed believes that tapering is not tightening, since it still expands the balance sheet, if at a slower rate, the markets interpret the slower rate as tightening. So the fact that "balance sheet uncertainty" becomes more manageable does not do much to alleviate uncertainty in the financial market.

Stein makes a suggestion that might go some ways towards addressing Thoma's concern about consistently overly-optimistic forecasts:
"A key point is that as we approach an FOMC meeting where an adjustment decision looms, it is appropriate to give relatively heavy weight to the accumulated stock of progress toward our labor market objective and to not be excessively sensitive to the sort of near-term momentum captured by, for example, the last payroll number that comes in just before the meeting...Not only do FOMC actions shape market expectations, but the converse is true as well: Market expectations influence FOMC actions. It is difficult for the Committee to take an action at any meeting that is wholly unanticipated because we don’t want to create undue market volatility. However, when there is a two-way feedback between financial conditions and FOMC actions, an initial perception that noisy recent data play a central role in the policy process can become somewhat self-fulfilling and can itself be the cause of extraneous volatility in asset prices. 
Thus both in an effort to make reliable judgments about the state of the economy, as well as to reduce the possibility of an undesirable feedback loop, the best approach is for the Committee to be clear that in making a decision in, say, September, it will give primary weight to the large stock of news that has accumulated since the inception of the program and will not be unduly influenced by whatever data releases arrive in the few weeks before the meeting – as salient as these releases may appear to be to market participants. I should emphasize that this would not mean abandoning the premise that the program as a whole should be both data-dependent and forward looking. Even if a data release from early September does not exert a strong influence on the decision to make an adjustment at the September meeting, that release will remain relevant for future decisions. If the news is bad, and it is confirmed by further bad news in October and November, this would suggest that the 7 percent unemployment goal is likely to be further away, and the remainder of the program would be extended accordingly."
The question is whether such a commitment would be credible. Market participants might believe that the Fed would treat September near-term news asymmetrically. Participants might (reasonably) believe that a data release from early September may not exert a strong influence on September decisionmaking if it were bad news, whereas if it were good news, the Fed would choose to use it to justify a return to normal.

While Stein recognizes the need to improve the Fed's communication strategy, he also points out that "there are limits to how much even good communication can do to limit market volatility, especially at times like these." In this respect his view is quite similar to that of James Hamilton, who questions the omnipotence sometimes ascribed to the Fed's communication, reminding us that the Fed's communication strategy is not the only determinant of long-term yields.
"Prior to the Great Recession, I thought we had all agreed on the practical limits on the Fed's capabilities. We understood that to some extent the Fed could control the short-term interest rate by changing the supply of reserves available to the banking system. But we also understood that the Fed's influence over longer-term interest rates was much less immediate and direct. The Fed can communicate its long-run inflation objectives, and certainly the 10-year inflation rate is a very important determinant of long-term yields. But regardless of what the Fed may say about its 10-year inflation goals, the market would form its own view of whether the Fed could or would achieve those. Other determinants of long-term yields, such as the term premium, long-run economic growth rate, and global saving and investment decisions were understood to be even farther beyond those things that the Fed can hope to control."
Stein puts it very similarly:
"At best, we can help market participants to understand how we will make decisions about the policy fundamentals that the FOMC controls – the path of future short-term policy rates and the total stock of long-term securities that we ultimately plan to accumulate via our asset purchases. Yet as research has repeatedly demonstrated, these sorts of fundamentals only explain a small part of the variation in the prices of assets such as equities, long-term Treasury securities, and corporate bonds. The bulk of the variation comes from what finance academics call “changes in discount rates,” which is a fancy way of saying the non-fundamental stuff that we don’t understand very well – and which can include changes in either investor sentiment or risk aversion, price movements due to forced selling by either levered investors or convexity hedgers, and a variety of other effects that fall under the broad heading of internal market dynamics...So while we have seen very significant increases in long-term Treasury yields since the FOMC meeting, I think it is a mistake to infer from these movements that there must have been an equivalently big change in monetary policy fundamentals."

Friday, June 28, 2013

Possible Futures for the European Banking Union

In September 2012, the European Commission proposed a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for banks as a preliminary step towards a European banking union. Plans for the union continue this week, as European Union leaders meet in Brussels to set new rules regarding how future bank bailouts will be paid for.

 Earlier this year, I attended the Future of the Euro Conference at UC Berkeley. One of the conference panels was about banking unions. The panelists all draw upon economic history to discuss the possible future of a European banking union. Here are videos of their talks:   

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Long Before the NSA...

The following clipping is from the April 15, 1813 edition of the Daily National Intelligencer. I came across it by accident, but thought it was worth sharing. In the United States Gazette, the government is accused  of having a "general office for breaking open private letters at Washington."

The Daily National Intelligencer counters that it is "entirely false that any letter of any description has been opened by the government, except letters passing to and from the enemy." The Daily National Intelligencer, if you were wondering, was edited by Joseph Gales, Jr. and William Seaton, supporters of the Madison and Monroe administration. They later became printers of Congress, and Gales became Mayor of Washington, D.C.




Sunday, June 23, 2013

The Sword of Greenspan

According to an ancient Greek parable, Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, had a courtier named Damocles who complemented Dionysius on his wealth and power. Dionysius asked Damocles if he would like to experience the kingly lifestyle. Damocles accepted the offer, and was enjoying the great luxury, until he noticed, hanging above him by a single horsehair, a gleaming sword. He then begged Dionysius to be allowed to leave the throne and return to his position as a courtier.

Common usage of the phrase "sword of Damocles" often misses the point of the story. According to classics scholar Daniel Mendelsohn, the sword of Damocles has come to refer to impending doom, even though:
"The real point of the story is very clearly a moral parable. It's not just, oh, something terrible is going to happen, but it's about realizing that what looks like an enviable life, a life of wealth, a life of power, a life of luxury is, in fact, fraught with anxiety, terror and possibly death.
And so that's the moral lesson of the original story, which has completely, I would say, gotten lost in the common usage. We all use that expression, oh, it's a sword of Damocles. But the point was all this stuff is meaningless, power, luxury and wealth, and if you know what's good for you, you'll be happy to be a much lesser kind of person."
The sword of Damocles frequently is used and misused in economic references. An Irish news article in 2011 titled "Inflation is sword of Damocles over Irish economy" uses the expression just to reference (alleged) impending doom. In "The Sword of Damocles hangs over Cyprus," the expression is slightly more correctly, as an analogy is made between Cyprus' decision to join the EU and Damocles' decision to try out the life of a king: "Like Damocles, some older Cypriots are now longing for their old farming lives, where living off the land was part and parcel of living here." And of course, the sword is used in the context of the Federal Reserve. Andy Kessler, for example, writes "The Fed’s inevitable Sword of Damocles could be brutal for bonds and stocks. Some of us recall the massacre of 1994."

Now, the original sword of Damocles was not used for massacre or brutality, so I think Kessler misuses the reference, missing the moral lesson of the story. He actually makes two sloppy allusions-- first to the sword, and second to 1994. Gavyn Davies writes that "The 1994 example, when the Fed failed to guide the markets about the likely pace of tightening, is of course part of the folklore of the bond market." Just as with the ancient parable of the sword of Damocles, the real lessons of the "parable" of 1994 are getting lost--dangerously--in the common usage.

Lately, the Fed's tightening actions in 1994 are coming into the spotlight as people wonder, and worry, about when the Fed will taper its bond buying program. The problem is that the more nuanced points of the 1994 episode have been lost to a simpler, cruder interpretation: that a move by the Fed (to slow the pace of purchases, for example) will be shortly followed by a succession of rate hikes. The lesson of 1994 is not that once the Fed starts tightening, it will just keep going, but unfortunately that is the lesson the markets choose to remember.

Let's look back at the Federal Reserve transcripts from 1994, when Alan Greenspan himself alluded to the sword of Damocles on multiple occasions. At the first meeting of the year, on February 3-4, the federal funds rate was at 3%, after having been lowered repeatedly since 1989. Discussions centered around how much to raise the rate. Mostly it was a question of raising by 25 or 50 basis points.
Vice Chairman McDonough: ... It seems to me that the question is not so much whether we should tighten but by how much...I think there are two downside aspects to a 50 basis point firming. First of all, it could be interpreted--and in my own view would be interpreted by a fair number of market participants--as a one-time fix, a one-time adjustment which would be followed by a "Fed-on-hold" period. Secondly, I think it could be deemed, especially in light of some of the discussion in this town and others, a macho response, and I've always thought macho responses confused brains and bravado. A 25 basis point move, on the other hand, I believe would send the right signal in the sense that the Federal Reserve, the central bank, is being watchful, as it should be...I think it would be interpreted as the first of a series of moves and thus would be deemed, in my view, to be a stronger signal than a 50 basis point increase--if the 50 basis point increase were seen, as I believe it would be, as a one-time adjustment to be followed by the "Fed on hold."
President Jordan: ... I would come down on the side of 50 basis points even though Bill McDonough's argument about that being viewed as a one-time adjustment followed by the "Fed on hold" is interesting. The other side of that would be that 25 basis points would be viewed clearly as the first of a series of moves. And if the market quickly built in pricing and expectations of the next 25 basis point move, then the equilibrium rate would move
at least as much as our move, implying de facto that we eased conditions relative to where the market is if it's ahead of us. I don't know what the timing might be as to market expectations, but if it's a fairly short horizon--maybe no further out than the next FOMC meeting--we may find that 25 was not enough to restrain reserve growth...
Chairman Greenspan: I thought about 50 basis points, or I thought about it in the sense of trying to move the rate to where we want to put it and then sticking with it. But I think it may be very helpful to have anticipations in the market now that we are going to move rates higher because it will subdue speculation in the stock market; at this particular stage having expectations hanging in the market that we may move again, and move reasonably soon, could have a very useful effect. If it is in any way contemplated that we have moved and are going to stop, that could create the type of erosion in the economy that I've watched over the past decades, which is precisely what we don't want. If we have the capability of having a Sword of Damocles over the market we can prevent it from running away... If we're going to move, I would not mind moving again at the next meeting or the meeting after that, for example. That depends on the evolution of events, frankly.
Greenspan got his way, after imploring the committee to "act unanimously." The February 14, 1994 New York Times reported that "in the two weeks since the rate action, it appears that rather than reassuring traders and investors, the Federal Reserve has managed to leave them with a worse case of the jitters. The financial markets seem to have increased their focus on inflation amid a general consensus that the Federal Reserve will have to raise short-term interest rates again soon. Both factors have led to a sharp selloff in the bond market and a jump in both long- and short-term interest rates." Later the article adds,
The interest rate hike validated the market's inflation fears," said Matthew F. Alexy, a government securities specialist at CS First Boston. "The market must have asked itself: Why would the Fed move to raise interest rates unless there was, in fact, a problem with inflation?"  
The added sensitivity was demonstrated Thursday when traders and investors chose to overlook the positive report on consumer prices in January, which were unchanged, and instead focused on a Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia report that suggested that prices had been on the rise in early February. 
The markets saw inflation where there was none. By the March 1994 meeting, Greenspan raised the case of the missing inflation. "...we are pretty far along in this business cycle. So why is inflation not showing its head a little more? Now, the next set of numbers may come out and I'll be sorry I said this, but the earlier experience raises the question: Is it automatically the case that when the economy is tightening up that inflation takes hold?" He recognized that inflation was nowhere to be seen, but halfway expected it to rear its head at any minute. And then he brought it up again: the Sword of Damocles!
Greenspan:  One of the elements that I think we have all been observing with respect to the markets--and one of the reasons why there has been such a level of instability in the markets--is that when we were perceived as moving on the basis of economic data, the markets had a certain sense of what it was we were doing...Now they are worried that they don't know when we are going to move, so we have this Sword of Damocles hanging over the market. They don't know whether we are going to move in 2 days, 5 days, or 12 days; they have no basis to judge and they are understandably nervous. So the question is, having very consciously and purposely tried to break the bubble and upset the markets in order to sort of break the cocoon of capital gains speculation, we are now in a position--having done that and in a sense succeeded perhaps more than we had intended--to try to restore some degree of confidence in the System. And that means we have to find a way, if at all possible, to move toward a policy stance from which we will not be perceived as about to move again in any short period of time.
The distinction between Greenspan's two uses of the sword is astounding and tragicomic. In February, the Sword is his tool; he controls it to serve his purpose. "If we have the capability of having a Sword of Damocles over the market we can prevent it from running away." By March, the Sword still hangs over the markets, but it is not Greenspan's tool; it works against him instead of for him. Greenspan is king of the markets, and the sword hangs above the throne. In February he speaks of the Sword as useful, and by March he wants it removed. He proposes this plan to remove it:
I think there is a certain advantage in [raising the rate by] 25 basis points because the markets, having seen two moves in a row of 25 basis points at a meeting, will tend almost surely to expect that the next move will be at the next meeting--or at least I think the probability of that occurring is probably higher than 50/50. If that is the case and the markets perceive that--and they perceive we are going to 4 percent by midyear, moving only at meetings--then we have effectively removed the Damocles Sword because our action becomes predictable with respect to timing as well as with respect to dimension. 
The plan is what in today's lingo we'd call "calendar objectives" as opposed to data objectives. Greenspan thought interest rates ultimately needed to get up to 4 or 4.5%, and wanted to set up a timeline to get there in movements of 25 basis points at each scheduled meeting. He thought that by moving by 25 bps at two meetings in a row, the markets would catch on and expect 25 bps at subsequent meetings (regardless of inflation, or lack thereof.) This timeline was not to be. At a conference call on April 18, before the next scheduled meeting, the rate was raised another 25 bps, then 50 in May, 50 in August, and 75 in November. Overall, 1994 was a bad year for bond investors and speculators (including Orange County, CA, which went  bankrupt after the rise in interest rates), but decent for the real economy. The Fed's actions that year were not ideal, but they also were not disastrous, except for certain categories of investors.

The real economy today faces a shakier recovery which could more easily be thrown off course. Inflation has not "shown its head" no matter how hard the markets and the Fed have looked for it. Since the data give no impetus toward reducing accomodation, the Committee, eager to exit, has switched to a calendar-based policy. President Bullard's press release describing his dissent to the FOMC decision announced on June 19, 2013, includes the following:
President Bullard also felt that the Committee’s decision to authorize the Chairman to lay out a more elaborate plan for reducing the pace of asset purchases was inappropriately timed. The Committee was, through the Summary of Economic Projections process, marking down its assessment of both real GDP growth and inflation for 2013, and yet simultaneously announcing that less accommodative policy may be in store...President Bullard felt that the Committee’s decision to authorize the Chairman to make an announcement of an approximate timeline for reducing the pace of asset purchases to zero was a step away from state-contingent monetary policy.
Tim Duy summarizes,
Bullard clearly felt the mood in the room was something to the effect of "We know the data is soft, but we want out of this program by the middle of next year, so we are going to lay out a program to do just that."...After weeks of being soothed by analysts saying that the data was key, that low inflation would stay the Fed's hand, Bernanke laid out clear as day a plan for ending quantitative easing by the middle of next year. Market participants then concluded exactly what Bullard concluded: It's the date, not the data.
Perhaps Chairman Bernanke looked up and glimpsed Greenspan's sword suspended above his head. I hope he can react to it with composure and not panic. The Committee in 1994 tried to manipulate market expectations through actions and through cryptic communications. While the expectations instrument was powerful, it was not precise. Although the Fed has improved its communications strategy since 1994, its messages still can have unintended consequences; 10-year yields rose sharply following the latest FOMC statement. Very clearly state-contingent monetary policy would be less confusing, and would project more confidence in the economy's eventual recovery, than semi-state-contingent, semi-calendar-driven policy. And if bond market participants look back to 1994 and expect a rapid succession of interest-rate hikes in the near future, the Fed should clearly communicate that this time will be different.